Superior Court E-Filing Update

Effective May 1, 2012, all civil miscellaneous cases, excluding expungements, gun permits, material witness warrants, search warrants, appeals from the Disability Board, and petitions or applications from the Department of Justice for information pertaining to a civil or criminal investigation, are required to be e-filed through the LexisNexis File & Serve program.  This expansion in e-filing was enacted by President Judge Vaughn through Administrative Directive No. 2012-3.  The new Directive rescinds and replaces Administrative Directive No. 2011-6. 

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Leslie Spoltore is an attorney with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP.  Leslie practices in Fox Rothschild's Wilmington, Delaware office.  You can reach Leslie at (302) 622-4203, or lspoltore@foxrothschild.com.

Delaware Superior Court Addresses Claims Of Malicious Prosecution, Abuse Of Process And Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress

Typically, spouses and former spouses engage in their legal disputes in Family Court.  In the case of Spence v. Spence, however, the clash between former spouses was not confined to the halls of Family Court.  Rather, their dispute included an action in the Superior Court.

The parties were married for a little over a year before they separated and then divorced.  After the divorce proceedings, protection from abuse proceedings and a hearing regarding a criminal charge of harassment, Mr. Spence filed an action in the Superior Court against his former wife.  The complaint included claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Based on these claims, Mr. Spencer sought to recover court costs, attorneys’ fees, medical fees, pre and post-judgment interest, lost wages and compensation for pain, suffering and mental anguish.  In response to the complaint, Ms. Spence filed a motion to dismiss the action. 

When considering the facts as alleged against the elements of each claim, the Court found Mr. Spence’s complaint lacking and granted the motion to dismiss with regard to all counts.  The Superior Court’s decision provides an brief yet interesting synopsis of the allegations that formed the basis for Mr. Spence’s complaint.   In addition, the decision provides a helpful analysis of the elements of each cause of action.   

The decision may be viewed in its entirety here.

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Leslie Spoltore is an attorney with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP.  Leslie practices in Fox Rothschild's Wilmington, Delaware office.  You can reach Leslie at (302) 622-4203, or lspoltore@foxrothschild.com.

Delaware Clarifies Law On The Legal Interest Rate

Governor Jack Markell recently signed Senate Bill No. 85 into law. This Bill modifies Section 2301(a) of Title 6 regarding the legal interest rate applicable to judgments. Specifically, the Bill provides that the applicable post-judgment interest rate on judgments entered in cases of personal loans is the lesser of the legal interest rate (5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate) or the contract rate. Senate Bill No. 85 may be reviewed in its entirety here.

Superior Court Examines Scope and Enforceability of General Releases

In a recent Superior Court Opinion in the matter of Riverbend Community, LLC, et al. v. Green Stone Engineering, LLC, et al., Judge Johnston examines the scope and enforceability of a General Release of Claims. The release at issue was executed in connection with civil and environmental engineering services provided for the planning and construction of a residential development. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants breached its contract with Plaintiffs by failing to identify a regulated wetland area. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim is barred by a general release signed by Plaintiffs (the Opinion also addresses negligence claims that were found to be barred by the economic loss doctrine).

Plaintiffs executed a general release exculpating Defendants from any liability in connection with engineering services provided. Plaintiffs assert three bases for invalidating the Release, "First, Plaintiffs claim that the release is ambiguous because it is subject to differing interpretations. Secondly, Plaintiffs contend that they executed the release under economic duress. Finally, Plaintiffs claim the parties were operating under a mutual mistake when the Release was signed."

1. AMBIGUITY

Initially, the Court found that the release was valid and unambiguous. The Court based its ruling on Plaintiffs' failure to present any evidence to suggest that they did not understand the terms of the release, or that the release was "reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations." Moreover, the Court stated that "[w]here the language of the release is clear and unambiguous, it will only be set aside where there is fraud, duress, coercion, or mutual mistake concerning the existence of the party’s injuries."

2. ECONOMIC DURESS

Plaintiffs claim that the release should be invalidated because Defendants refused to release any designs, plans, or specifications unless Plaintiffs executed the release exculpating Defendants from all liabilities. The Court was not convinced by this argument. "Economic duress exists where one is deprived of the free exercise of will through wrongful threats or acts directed against a party’s business interests. A claim for economic duress will not lie, however, where the party has a reasonable alternative to succumbing and fails to take advantage of it." Further, in ruling that the release was not executed under economic duress, the Court explained that,

While Defendants may have driven a hard bargain in refusing to release work product unless Plaintiffs executed the Release, aggressive negotiation is insufficient to constitute duress. In every contract negotiation there is an implied threat that the party will not perform unless his terms are accepted. This type of implied threat is a necessary part of the bargaining process.

Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ principal, a sophisticated and seasoned businessman, executed the Release. Further, Plaintiffs were free to consult an attorney prior to executing the Release. Therefore, it cannot be said that Plaintiffs were under economic duress at the time they signed the Release.

3. MUTUAL MISTAKE

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the release should be invalidated because at the time it was executed, the parties were mutually mistaken as to the existence of potential wetlands violations. "A mutual mistake occurs when both parties are under substantially the same erroneous belief as to the facts." Mutual mistake is determined by evaluating the facts as they existed at the time the release was signed. The Release in question "unambiguously releases Defendants of liability for all claims, including those which were known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, past, present, and future." As such, the Court was not persuaded by Plaintiffs' arguments that the parties did not intend to release Defendants of future unknown claims. "The Release plainly covers the claims that Plaintiffs now raise, which, the Court notes, were not wholly unforeseeable. The alleged failure of the parties to understand the scope and effect of the Release, despite the unambiguous language, does not support a finding of mutual mistake."

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Seth Niederman is an attorney with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP. Seth practices in Fox Rothschild's Wilmington, Delaware office. You can reach Seth at 302-622-4238, or sniederman@foxrothschild.com.

The Superior Court Addresses Expert Report Deadlines And Spoliation

There is no shortage of discussion regarding spoliation among litigators today.  In this time of social networking, email and electronically stored information, the discussion often relates to some form of electronic discovery.  Despite the advances in technology, claims of spoliation are still equally important to physical evidence as the decision issued in the case of Brandes v. EBSCO Industries et al. reminds us.  In addition, the case of Brandes is an interesting and cautionary tale about the importance of early preparation of expert reports.

Background

Andrew Brandes was employed by Everest Auto Works.  Brandes alleged that on June 30, 2008 he was assembling a freestanding outdoor advertising sign, and as he was doing so he was injured when he was struck in the head by the sign’s sharp edge.  The Complaint filed by Brandes in the Superior Court alleged that the sign was defective.

The sign at issue was in the possession of Brandes or his counsel during most of the time the litigation was pending.  Brandes’ expert, Gary Sheesley, inspected the sign and issued a report opining that the sign was defective because it had sharp exposed edges. This report was provided to counsel for Defendants on June 24, 2010 and then again on March 7, 2011.

In November 2011, Defendants contacted Brandes’ counsel to arrange for an inspection of the sign so their expert could inspect the sign prior to the expert report deadline of December 13, 2011.  In connection with arranging this inspection, Brandes’ counsel learned that Everest Auto Works had been sold in April 2011, but counsel understood that the original sign was still on the property.  It was not until Defendants’ counsel was en route to the inspection on November 22, 2011 that Brandes’ counsel learned that the sign had been recently discarded.  Brandes’ counsel immediately contacted Defendants’ counsel with this news. 

Upon learning of the missing sign, Brandes’ counsel ordered an exemplar freestanding outdoor advertising sign, which he believed to be identical to the sign involved.

Defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude Brandes from presenting Mr. Sheesley’s expert testimony.  Defendants claimed they were seriously prejudiced because they could not have their own expert examine the actual sign at issue.  In response,  Brandes argued that Defendants were not severely prejudiced by the absence of the sign because, inter alia, Brandes made the exemplar sign available for inspection by Defendants’ expert.  Further, Brandes argued that the sanction sought by Defendants was not appropriate since Brandes did not deliberately or intentionally destroy evidence.  Finally, Brandes alleged that the harm to Defendants’, to the extent there was any, was self inflicted by Defendants’ own delay in inspecting the sign.

The Motion In Limine

The Court’s decision on this Motion provides an informative analysis of spoliation claims and the distinction between the loss of evidence resulting from actions based in bad faith and those resulting from negligent conduct.  In the former, the sanction of dismissal may be appropriate.  However, for the latter, a lesser sanction such as an adverse inference instruction to the jury may be appropriate.  The three pronged test utilized to determine the appropriate sanction required the Court to consider:

1) the degree of fault and personal responsibility of the party who destroyed the evidence;

2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the other party; and

3) the availability of lesser sanctions which would avoid any unfairness to the innocent party while, at the same time, serving as a sufficient penalty to deter the same type of conduct in the future.

In this case, the Court concluded that Brandes’ counsel should have been on notice that the sign needed to be preserved.  However, the Court also noted that there was no evidence to suggest that Brandes or his attorney deliberately or intentionally destroyed the sign.  While Defendants were prejudiced by the absence of the sign, the Court found the hardship to be mitigated by the existence of the exemplar sign and photographs of the original sign.  In addition, the Court found it could not “overlook the fact that the defendants are not entirely blameless” because they waited 17 months to arrange for an inspection of the allegedly defective product. 

At the conclusion of its analysis, the Court denied the request to preclude Mr. Sheesley’s testimony.  The Court did, however, find that an adverse inference jury instruction should be utilized.

The Motion For Reconsideration

Defendants filed a Motion For Reconsideration arguing that the Court’s decision on the Motion In Limine was based in part upon a conclusion that Defendants should have acted sooner to inspect the sign.  In doing so, Defendants argued, the Court ignored its own Trial Scheduling Order, with which Defendants were in compliance since the inspection was scheduled in November 2011 and the expert report deadline was not until December 13, 2011.

The Court rejected Defendants’ argument stating “Irrespective of the fact that Defendants still had additional time under the Trial Scheduling Order, nothing in the Court’s analysis suggests that the deadline was even relevant to the analysis . . . The Court is well aware of this deadline but it still believes that the length of time it took for Defendants to take any action contributed to the likelihood that the sign would have been discarded or misplaced.”

Defendants also argued that the late scheduled inspection was a strategic decision to prevent Mr. Sheesley from amending his report.  This argument was similarly rejected by the Court.  Having rejected the Defendants’ arguments, the Motion For Reconsideration was denied.

Will there be an appeal?  Only time will tell.

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Leslie Spoltore is an attorney with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP.  Leslie practices in Fox Rothschild's Wilmington, Delaware office.  You can reach Leslie at (302) 622-4203, or lspoltore@foxrothschild.com.

Admission Pro Hac Vice - Lessons From The Delaware Court Of Chancery

Filing an application to admit counsel pro hac vice can often seem like a routine task.  However, the Court of Chancery reminds us that full disclosure and attention to detail must be utilized when seeking to admit fellow counsel pro hac viceCarl Neff authored a blog post that provides a helpful and informative account of the Court of Chancery’s recent order addressing an application to revoke an admission pro hac vice.  His post, entitled “Court of Chancery Denies Motion to Revoke Pro Hac Vice Admission of Out of State Attorney, but Refers Attorney to Disciplinary Authorities,” can be found in full on the Delaware Court of Chancery Practice Blog.

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Leslie Spoltore is an attorney with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP.  Leslie practices in Fox Rothschild's Wilmington, Delaware office.  You can reach Leslie at (302) 622-4203, or lspoltore@foxrothschild.com.

The Impact Of The Madoff Mess On A Divorce - Lessons From New York

Eric Solotoff, a Partner in our Roseland, New Jersey office has written several blog posts on the case of Simkin v. Blank as that case wound its way through the New York court system.  The saga began in June 2006, when the parties entered into an agreement that provided for the equal division of the $5.4 million account they had with Madoff Securities. Based on this agreement, the husband gave the wife $2.7 million in cash, and retained the account. As a result of the Madoff Ponzi scheme that has essentially rendered the account worthless, the husband filed suit seeking the $2.7 million that he paid the wife. The husband alleged that because the account turned out to be valueless, the spirit of the agreement was broken.  Eric’s latest blog post, entitled Madoff Mess Hits the Divorce Court - The End, sets forth in more detail the history of the case and what may be its final chapter as the New York Court of Appeals has ruled that the husband could not reverse his divorce deal.  It is an interesting post, which demonstrates yet another facet of the impact of the Ponzi scheme.

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Leslie Spoltore is an attorney with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP.  Leslie practices in Fox Rothschild's Wilmington, Delaware office.  You can reach Leslie at (302) 622-4203, or lspoltore@foxrothschild.com.

 

Superior Court CCLD Adds Request For Judicial Action Form

In a continuing effort to be accessible to litigants, the Complex Commercial Litigation Division ("CCLD") of the Delaware Superior Court recently added a form of Certification and Request for Judicial Action.  The Request for Judicial Action form allows parties to request the scheduling of: (1) Office Conference, (2) Trial, or (3) Argument/Hearing.  In addition, the Request for Judicial Action form includes a section for parties to indicate the Summary of Action Desired.  This form will be useful in matters where expedited or emergency consideration is necessary.  The form resembles the Request For Judicial Action form available in the Chancery Court. 

A copy of the 2010 Administrative Directive establishing the CCLD can be found here.  In order to be eligible for the CCLD, a matter must include one of the following:

  • Include a claim of One Million Dollars or more;
  • Involve an exclusive choice of court agreement; or
  • Otherwise designated by the President Judge.

The following cases are specifically excluded from the CCLD:

  • Personal physical or mental injury;
  • Mortgage foreclosure;
  • Mechanics  lien actions;
  • Condemnation proceedings;
  • Cases involving an exclusive choice of court agreement where a party to the agreement is an individual acting primarily for personal, family, or household purposes;
  • Cases where the agreement relates to an individual or collective contract of employment.

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Seth Niederman is an attorney with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP. Seth practices in Fox Rothschild's Wilmington, Delaware office. You can reach Seth at 302-622-4238, or sniederman@foxrothschild.com.

Lifetime Alimony Provisions In Marital Property Settlement Agreements

Section 1512 of the Delaware Code addresses a party’s claim for alimony.  Of note is subsection (g), which provides in part:

Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, the obligation to pay future alimony is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage or cohabitation of the party receiving alimony.

Some parties to a divorce action, like Danielle M. Stewart (“Wife”) and Thomas D. Stewart (“Husband”),  enter into settlement agreements with terms providing for lifetime alimony. This can lead to future litigation as the case of Stewart v. Stewart demonstrates.

Background

The Stewarts were married in February 1984, separated in April 2005, briefly reconciled in August/September 2005, and permanently separated in November 2005.   Thereafter, in June 2006, the Family Court entered the Final Decree of divorce.   During their separation, the parties entered into the Marital Property Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”), which was incorporated into their Final Decree of divorce in June 2006.  The Agreement, which became the subject of the appeal, provides in relevant part:

2. Support. Should reconciliation fail, Husband agrees to pay permanent alimony to Wife in the amount of One Thousand, Two Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents ($1,200.00) per month. This alimony shall commence upon separation of the parties and will continue in force and effect for the life of Wife.

At the time the parties executed the Agreement, Husband was not represented by counsel. Husband had dismissed his counsel in September 2005 because he and Wife intended to reconcile at that time.  Unlike Husband, Wife retained her counsel throughout the process.  Wife’s counsel drafted the agreement and it was signed by both parties at counsel’s office.

Almost five years after the entry of the Final Decree, on March 18, 2011, the Husband filed a Petition to Modify Alimony.  His Petition sought to modify his alimony obligation based on a real and substantial change in circumstances - Wife’s cohabitation with another man for two years.  Husband also argued that he did not understand the implications of the Agreement on alimony because he lacked legal counsel.  Based on the nature of Husband’s claim, the Family Court construed Husband’s Petition as one to reform or rescind the Agreement.

On April 14, 2011, the Wife filed a Motion for Specific Performance and Rule to Show Cause on grounds that the Husband stopped paying alimony as required by the Agreement.  The Court consolidated Wife’s and Husband’s respective Petitions.

During a hearing on the petitions, Husband testified that he did not understand the alimony provision.  He testified that he thought “[alimony] was going to be until either she got remarried, passed away, moved in with somebody.”  Based on his testimony and the remainder of the record, the Family Court determined that the Agreement’s alimony provision was unconscionable. 

An appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court followed.

The Appeal

The Supreme Court examined the history of prior cases addressing challenges to lifetime alimony.  In doing so, the Court found the holding in Marseno v. Marseno, 1980 WL 20453, at *1 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 14, 1980) relevant in this matter.  In Marseno, the Family Court held:

In good conscience a court should be repelled by the prospect of making its powers available for the enforcement of a contract that is patently unfair and the result of overreaching.  It is, of course, no answer to the victim of an unfair contract to say “you made your contractual bed now go lie in it.”  Such an approach would not only be terribly destructive of human spirit but would actually make the court an accessory to overreaching and unfairness.  The problem is immeasurably compounded when the victimized spouse was unrepresented while the other spouse had counsel who prepared the contract and, perhaps, supervised its negotiation and/or execution.

Applying these principals to the case at hand, the Court noted that Husband entered the Agreement shortly after dismissing his counsel, a dismissal that was premised on a belief that reconciliation was near.  The Agreement reflected this belief and provided that the Wife would be entitled to the alimony payments “[s]hould reconciliation fail.” The Court was similarly mindful that Wife had the benefit of counsel throughout the proceedings.  Her counsel drafted the Agreement and hosted the meeting during which the Agreement was signed by the parties. Based on the record below, the Court found support for the Family Court’s factual findings that paragraph 2 of the Agreement was overreaching and unfair. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the Family Court’s conclusion that the Agreement was unconscionable and subject to reformation.

The decision in the case of Stewart v. Stewart may be viewed in its entirety here.

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Leslie Spoltore is an attorney with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP.  Leslie practices in Fox Rothschild's Wilmington, Delaware office.  You can reach Leslie at (302) 622-4203, or lspoltore@foxrothschild.com.

Delaware Supreme Court Finds Denial Of Request For Continuance To Be An Abuse of Discretion

Background

On October 10, 2007, Marian Roache was driving her two sons, Kaliff and Kyrees, in New Castle County when Constance Rogers’ car collided with theirs. Roache alleges that she and her two sons sustained injuries as a result of the accident.  On October 7, 2009, Roache filed a complaint in Delaware Superior Court seeking to recover damages sustained as a result of the accident.  The complaint alleged that Roache suffered serious and permanent personal injuries, including but not limited to cervical strain and sprain and a herniated disc at L4-5.  Prior to the filing of the Complaint, Rogers passed away for reasons unrelated to the accident.  Stanley Charney served as Administrator of Rogers’ estate. 

On June 13, 2011, Charney, acting on behalf of the estate of Rogers, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) claiming that Roache’s expert report failed to set forth an opinion on causation between the medical treatment provided and Roache’s automobile collision. The trial judge held a hearing on the Motion on June 27, 2011.  During the hearing, the trial judge addressed the expert’s report as follows:

[V]iewing it most favorably to the non-moving party, I still don’t have anything [from the expert] other than I saw her following the motor vehicle accident and this is what [the expert] treated her for, or this is what [the expert] did in response to what [the expert] saw, but there’s no mention of any causal reference . . .

The trial judge agreed with Charney and held that Roache’s expert failed to set forth an opinion on causation. 

Roache then sought a 24 hour continuance to clarify the meaning of her expert’s report. The trial judge, however, found that a continuance would be problematic because Charney would then have to “go back and look at [his] expert and see whether they need to get this matter, or have a further response or hire another expert” only 8 days before trial.  Ultimately, the judge concluded that there was no basis for a continuance.  In addition, he did not think it would be appropriate to allow any supplemental reports based upon the procedural posture of the case.

Summary judgment was granted and an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court followed.  Specifically, Roache appealed on two grounds: (1) the expert report was sufficient to survive the motion for summary judgment; and (2) the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the continuance.

The Appeal

The Supreme Court concluded that Roache’s expert did in fact fail to provide an opinion on causation.  That conclusion, however, did not resolve the appeal.  The Supreme Court then turned its attention to Roache’s claim that the trial court’s denial of her request for a continuance was an abuse of discretion. 

The Court noted that the abuse of discretion presents a high standard of review.  Citing to past decisions, the Court described the standard as follows:

Judicial discretion is the exercise or judgment directed by conscience and reason, and when a court has not exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has not so ignored recognized rules of law or practice as to produce injustice, its legal discretion has not been abused.

In contrast, the Court noted, when a trial judge exceeds the bounds of reason in light of the circumstances or ignores recognized rules of law or practice to in a manner that produces injustice, discretion has been abused.

The guidelines for reviewing the grant or denial of a request for a continuance provide that the party seeking the continuance has the burden of establishing a record of the relevant facts.  One such relevant fact is the length of the requested continuance. After providing the trial judge with this information, the party seeking the continuance must also demonstrate:

(a) that it was diligent in preparing for the presentation of the testimony;

(b) that the continuance will be likely to satisfy the need to present the testimony;

(c) that the inconvenience to the Court, opposing parties, witnesses and jurors is insubstantial in relation to the likely prejudice which would result from the denial of the continuance.

Applying this test to the record below, the Supreme Court found that Roache satisfied her initial burden by establishing a record of facts relating to the continuance and specifically including the length of the brief requested continuance.  The Court similarly concluded that the record below demonstrated Roache satisfied the remainder of her burden.   As a result, the Supreme Court found the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to grant the 24 hour continuance, and the trial court’s decision was reversed.

The decision may be read in its entirety here.

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Leslie Spoltore is an attorney with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP.  Leslie practices in Fox Rothschild's Wilmington, Delaware office.  You can reach Leslie at (302) 622-4203, or lspoltore@foxrothschild.com.